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The Takings Clause and the Separation of
Powers: An Essay
JOHN

A. HUMBACH*

The protection of private property lies at the very core of environmental law. After all, except on the high seas, just about all of
the "environment" either is somebody's private property or lies
just above it. Environmental regulation is, bluntly, the regulation
of private property. The basic purpose of environmental laws is to
help assure that private owners treat their property with appropriate ecological respect. The reason we need environmental laws
is that private owners are not always inclined to act in ways that
respect our shared environment.
The most fundamental environmental problem is this: across
our nation there are literally hundreds of millions of acres of important natural resource lands-farms, forests, wetlands, reservoir watersheds, shore lands, endangered species habitat-lands
that have relatively little commercial value in their present natural condition, but which would have much greater commercial
value if their natural values were degraded or destroyed. Stated
differently, private property often will yield a much greater profit
to its owner if it is used in ways that will harm or obliterate important environmental assets and values. For this reason, private
owners are understandably tempted to supplant and eliminate the
long-term natural values of their lands in order to carry out
projects that will yield them the greatest returns in their own lifetimes. When faced with the grand trade-off between present gratification and future generations, a lot of people naturally favor
themselves.
Free markets are, in this context, almost inevitably driven to
fail. This "market failure" is inevitable because people whose time
horizons go out only a few decades determine the market valuations of future returns. Many people tend to have little interest in
* John A. Humbach is a professor of law at Pace University Law School in
White Plains, New York.
This essay is based on remarks given at the Pace Environmental Law Review
Symposium, March 28, 2003, Symposium Panel 1.
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returns that will accrue long after the ends of their own lifetimes
and, as a result, the market tends to value these more distant returns at or near zero.1 The fertile, well-watered farm land of New
Jersey, for example, may be capable of pushing up crops to relieve
human hunger for the next 5000 years, as much of the fertile land
of India, Egypt, and China has already done. But this long-term
potential is of little practical concern to the farmer who wants to
do the best he can for himself and his family during his own lifetime. Such a farmer may, therefore, be understandably tempted
to sell the land to a developer who will pave it over and destroy its
biological productivity forever. Because the dazzle of near-term
gain can blind people to slower but perpetual potentials, untold
future natural productivity is jeopardized by the operation of normal market forces. The face of the earth and fate of our national
land is being irrevocably shaped by the market forces of our
generation.
Now, overall, there are really only two practical policy
choices: either we adopt environmental laws that will protect and
defend our nation's one and only national land base from shortsighted modifications and poorly planned development, or we can
surrender the fate of our national land, and the quality of our descendants' lives, to the self-oriented decisions of a relative fewthe tiny percentage of the American population that happens to
own the lion's share of the nation's undeveloped land. That is it:
either adopt comprehensive environmental laws regulating and
restricting the ways in which people can modify the uses of private
property-especially ecological assets-or cross our fingers, say a
prayer, and hope that the self-interest and self-oriented motivations of the relative handful of large land owners, in our generation, will produce good results for all of future time.
I want to stress that most property owners do not pose a development threat to long-term environmental values. That is because most owners of real property are content with the uses to
which their property is already being put; in any event, they cannot legally change the use. That is to say, most American landowners hold small parcels of land located in cities and suburbs,
places where ordinary zoning regulations have long made it unlawful to put land to a different use just because there would be a

1. For example, using a 3% inflation-adjusted (or "real") interest rate, the present value of a $1000 return to be received in the year 2150 would be about $12.
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profit to be made in doing so. 2 For most of this vast preponderance of American landholders-ordinary homeowners and proprietors of small businesses-their property has already been
developed to more or less the maximum extent permissible under
the zoning laws. A homeowner might find that he or she could
double, quadruple, or increase tenfold the value of his or her property by converting it from a residence to a commercial storefront, a
doctor's office, or a welding shop, but under ordinary zoning laws
this normally cannot be done. Most people would probably agree,
moreover, that such changes should not be done because they
would be profoundly undesirable. That is why zoning laws are
widely popular.
As applied in cities and developed suburbs, the net effect of
the ordinary zoning laws essentially amounts to "existing use zoning."3 That is, in most cities virtually all of the land base is zoned
to remain in the uses that already exist. Under such a regulatory
regime, individuals may lose the chance to score a profit by intensifying the use of their land, but the prohibition on their doing so
is generally accepted. The fundamental goal is the protection of
the interests of others. It is recognized that each person's "private" property is part of the "environment" of everybody else, and
the private use of privately owned land is not a totally private
affair.
By contrast, the situation is entirely different for the smallish
group of people who hold the vast bulk of the American land base,
including most of the undeveloped and environmentally vulnerable lands of our nation. The owners of most of these lands never
have been legally restricted to the lands' "existing" uses in the
way that is normal for most American owners (those owning land
in cities). What is more, the owners of environmentally sensitive
lands typically have no expectation that they even ought to be restricted in the land-use choices they make. On the contrary, de2. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), is the landmark
case upholding the constitutionality of traditional zoning regulations. See also Gorieb
v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927) (upholding set-back restrictions and stating that
"zoning laws prescribing ... the height of buildings ... and the extent of the area to be
left open for light and air . . . are, in their general scope, valid under the federal
Constitution."). See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 4-1 to 4-40
(5th ed. 2003).
3. For a more detailed explanation of "existing use zoning," see my earlier article
Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339 (1989). For further information
and a model of an "existing-use zoning" ordinance, see also http://www.law.pace.edu/
jhumbachlpublicationsonline.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2003).
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spite the fact that their choices can affect not only themselves but
also the quality of life of all Americans, present and future, the
expectations expressed by larger-tract owners are often exactly
the opposite-that "nobody" has any business telling them what to
do with their land (and our nation's environment). Hence, the battles over private property rights.
Now we could, of course, decide that private property rights
ought to be protected as a paramount point of policy, much the
way we accord protection to free speech, choice of religion, and
other such guarantees in the Bill of Rights. If we did so, however,
we would essentially be leaving the future of America's undeveloped lands and natural resources to the relative handful of people
who happen to own them in our generation. We have not, however, decided to give such primacy to private property. On the
contrary, the very reason our environmental protection laws have
been enacted is that our nation has decided (if somewhat halfheartedly) not to leave our nation's land-resource future to a relative handful of persons. Instead, the enactment of our environmental laws expresses our nation's decision that all Americans
have a legitimate voice in the future of American land, the national land base on which we all depend and which our descendants all must share.
America is a republic-literally, a "thing of the people." What
this means is that our country's destiny belongs, first and foremost, to the people as a whole, not to a narrow class of larger-scale
landowners-as it was in eighteenth century England, against
which we fought a Revolution to escape. America's future and
that of the American land belongs to the whole people, and our
body of environmental laws represents our nation's democracydriven choice that some uses of private land are simply too socially
intolerable to allow.
Unfortunately, however, one of the constants of post-Medieval
history is that the large-landowner classes have never much cared
for democracy-driven choices. The present situation in the United
States is no different. Today it is expressed in the form of landowner antipathy towards environmental laws. When environmental laws have real bite-depriving owners of near-term
bonanzas they might otherwise reap-the owners are inclined to
resist. In recent years, this resistance has taken the form of landowner demands for "compensation." When a law deprives an
owner of the ability to profit by changing the use of private land,
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the argument goes, the taxpayers should pay compensation for the
opportunity (value) lost.
Before looking at the legal terms of this argument, we should
consider the moral context. Basically, landowners' claims for
"compensation" seem to be based on the idea that we have two
kinds of laws in this country. First, there are the laws that people
are supposed to obey. Obedience is expected even though a person
might have to pass up certain private advantages that might otherwise accrue. Then (some seem to assume) there is a second kind
of laws, the ones that people should not have to obey unless they
get paid for the inconvenience of doing so. Laws prohibiting the
degradation or destruction of important ecological resources fall
into this second category. When holders of large undeveloped
tracts find it inconvenient or burdensome to comply with these
laws, they claim they are entitled to "just compensation," payment
from the taxpayers for the burden of obeying the law.
Fundamentally, the reason we have laws at all is because
some behavior is simply too socially intolerable to allow. It may be
robbing banks or filling wetlands, or whatever, but the common
feature of the behavior prohibited by law is that it cannot be socially tolerated. Now ordinarily, when people engage in socially
intolerable behavior, it is not a defense that the behavior is profitable. For example, when customs agents seize a shipment of cocaine belonging to a drug dealer, no one thinks the dealer should
receive compensation because the government has taken his "private property" and his chance to make a profit. The laws that prohibit drug trafficking are examples of the first kind of law that I
mentioned earlier-the ones people are supposed to obey: importing cocaine is simply too socially intolerable to allow, period.
And so it is with a wide range of laws. For example, in the
land-use area, a person may wish to utilize property as a house of
ill-fame, as a child porn shop, or as a garden for raising marijuana-or for any of a number of socially intolerable uses. Nobody
suggests, however, that people are entitled to be paid compensation for the profits they forgo in not making such uses. What is
different about laws that forbid construction on tidal wetlands,
that prohibit destruction of valuable farmland, or that prevent the
extermination of whole species through the destruction of habitat?
What is different about laws that forbid developments that will
contaminate valuable drinking water reservoirs or pollute the air
we all breathe? There does seem to be a difference, in the minds of
at least some. For these kinds of laws-environmental protection
5
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laws-seem to fall into the second category. People seriously contend that, if the government wants to prevent these socially intolerable actions, it must be ready to pay "just compensation" for the
lost profits that such actions could have produced.
What we are seeing here, of course, is pure and simple selective morality. The alleged constitutional basis for this selective
morality is the so-called "takings clause" found in the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 4 On first reading,
it may not be easy to see how the clause could serve as a basis for
claiming compensation for obeying the law. What the takings
clause says is: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use
5
without just compensation."
For present purposes, the key word is "taken." By using the
word "taken," the clause seems to refer most obviously to situations in which the government makes direct physical appropriations of property, i.e., when it "takes" the land (or other property)
away. 6 That is, moreover, pretty clearly what the Framers of the
Constitution had in mind. 7 Indeed, for the first 130 years of the
Republic, there was not much doubt that the takings8 clause only
actually applied to direct takings of private property.
For most of the twentieth century, however, the takings
clause has led very much of a dual existence-constituting a
straightforward compensation requirement for cases of physical
invasions of private property while also vaguely promising a possibility of compensation, under ill-defined circumstances, when the
government affects property values by regulation.9 Broadly
speaking, so-called regulatory takings refer to takings of private
4. U.S. CONST. amend.

V.

5. Id.
6. The text of the Fifth Amendment itself provides a basis for drawing a
distinction between physical takings and regulatory takings. Its plain
language requires the payment of compensation whenever the government acquires private property for a public purpose ....

But the Consti-

tution contains no comparable reference to regulations that prohibit a
property owner from making certain uses of her private property.
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321-22
(2002) (emphasis added).
7. See William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985).
8. At the time of Mugler v. Kansas, the Supreme Court went to pains to insist
that, for the takings clause to apply, there must be a "physical invasion of the real
estate of the private owner, and a practical ouster of his possession." Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887) (quoting Trans. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878)).
The Mugler case is discussed infra text accompanying notes 41-59.
9. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 321-22.
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property interests by governmental actions that do not involve any
physical invasion or impingement. Within this broad conception,
however, the task of defining when a regulatory action actually
becomes a compensable taking has proved elusive. After more
than 100 years of interpretive effort, 10 there has been no real progress in formulating a coherent, principled, and widely accepted
basis for the "regulatory takings" concept. Thus, in the dual existence led by the takings clause, permanent physical takings are
virtually always compensable" while so-called regulatory takings
virtually never are.
Fundamentally, the reason for this discrepant treatment is
that so-called "regulatory takings" are a specious category. Indeed, I think it does not go too far to say that the conception of
regulatory takings has no underlying "principle" at all, except a
veiled skepticism about democratic government. The skepticism
is not entirely irrational. Wealthier landowners recognize that
those with little to lose may be all too willing to support property
restrictions at the expense of those who may lose a lot.
Now there is nothing wrong with a healthy skepticism about
government, but it is hard to see how the solution to the problem
of over-regulation is to require the government to "regulate by
purchase."1 2 While it is true that making the government pay a
"price" to enact regulation would cut down on over-regulation, it
must be recognized that such a price will not only deter bad laws
but hinder the adoption of needed ones as well.
At any rate, the fundamental reason for the discrepant treatment of physical and regulatory takings is that, in the final analysis, it is the government's job, its very role, to restrict behavior by
regulation, and almost everything the government does is likely to
have an effect on economic values. There is simply no way that
the government could compensate for all the negative effects that
4
13
its actions have on property values. There must be limits.'
10. It is probably fair to say that Mugler v. Kansas marks the beginning of the
Supreme Court's active input into the regulatory takings interpretive controversy.
The turning point came in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), discussed infra text accompanying notes 62-84.
11. But cf. United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (denying compensation for
private terminal facilities which the United States Army deliberately destroyed to
prevent them from falling into enemy hands). Such examples of "emergency" or the
like all have ample special features that clearly predominate the physical-invasion
aspects of the government's action.
12. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
13. Indeed, in the case that first recognized the concept of a "regulatory taking,"
the Supreme Court wrote: "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values
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One possible approach is to find such limits in the text of the
takings clause itself, such as by recognizing a suitable limiting
definition of the critical term "property." Such a limiting definition might, for example, confine compensable "property" to something on the
order of Holfeldian "rights" but not Holfeldian
"privileges."'15 As I have shown in an earlier article, by carefully
formulating two distinct conceptions (for convenience referred to
as "rights" and "freedoms"), it is possible to provide an account of
the Supreme Court's takings cases that neatly divides them along
16
the same lines as they are in fact divided.
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
the general law." Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). What the Court
did not explain is what countervailing principle would require the government to "regulate by purchase" in those cases where only valuable uses of property happened to be
uses that are too socially intolerable to allow.
14. See Tahoe-SierraPres. Council, 535 U.S. at 323-24 (2002) ("Land-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of them impact property in some tangential way. .. ")
15. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOLFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 35-50
(Cook ed. 1919), also found in 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). Briefly, Holfeld argued that it
was crucial to clear thinking to distinguish "rights" (meaning essentially the legal
advantage of being able to enforce some duty held by one or more others) from "privileges" (meaning the freedom to do something untrammeled by any right of others to
stop you, i.e., having a privilege means not being burdened by a duty).
16. See my earlier article, A Unifying Theory for the Just-Compensation Cases:
Takings, Regulation and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 251-76 (1982) [hereinafter Unifying Theory]. Compare, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), with Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (2002) and Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987). The critical, and potentially most controvertible move in the previous article
was to treat a deprivation of freedom as a taking of "rights" when the freedom deprivation is so extensive that it renders the right nugatory-the "functional equivalent"
of a taking of the rights themselves. See Unifying Theory, supra, at 273. The Supreme Court later (in Lucas) repeated and endorsed this echo of Holmes' original conception, though it took a perhaps rather more generous view of "functional
equivalent." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014.
The policy explanation that I gave for the rights/freedoms dichotomy was largely
the same as that enunciated for the physical/regulatory distinction in Tahoe-Sierra
PreservationCouncil, 535 U.S. at 323-24 ("Treating [ubiquitous land-use regulations]
as per se takings would transform government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford [whereas] physical appropriations are relatively rare, easily identified and usually represent a greater affront to individual property rights.")
The primary difference between the defined conceptual distinction described in
Unifying Theory as in "fact" dividing the cases and the one the Supreme Court ostensibly adheres to is this: The Supreme Court treats a "mere" deprivation of "freedom"
as occasion for "complex factual assessments of the purpose and economic effects of
government actions." Tahoe-SierraPres. Council, 535 U.S. at 323 (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992)). According to an historical survey done for Unifying Theory, however, a mere deprivation of "freedoms" in fact means that no
compensable taking will be recognized. In other words, absent a finding that there
was a freedom-deprivation amounting to a functional equivalent of a taking of
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The regulatory takings cases do not, however, make any such
conceptual distinction 17 and they do not define, even roughly,
what would fall within the ambit of "property immune from regulation." This somewhat striking omission convinces me that the
real issue in the regulatory takings cases is not about property
rights at all.' 8 The real issue is about the allocation of governmental power, specifically, who should decide, so as to bind us all,
what is and is not "too socially intolerable to allow"? It is a question, in other words, that goes to the very structure of government.
When various interests in society disagree about issues of policy
and values, who decides? In the environmental protection sphere,
who decides which uses of land are, and are not, too unacceptable?
When property owners invoke the takings clause in an effort to get
a court to trump legislation, the implicit contention is inevitably
that the ultimate governmental power to decide should reside not
in the democratically elected legislatures but in the courts.
That the real question is about the structure of government,
not about "rights," is clearly enough shown by the conventional
contexts in which regulatory takings cases arise. Almost invariably the private litigant's primary technical request for relief is for
the court to overturn the results of the democratic legislative process. The immediate object is to convince the court that it should
not adhere to the policy choices made by the representatives of the
people.
The history of takings law also amply demonstrates that the
essential question of regulatory takings is about the constitutional
structure of government, not the content or extent of private
rights. Indeed, the modern law of regulatory takings began not
with the takings clause but elsewhere, especially in the Constitution's due process clauses.
The original due process clause is contained in the Fifth
Amendment. It states, "no person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law."' 9 The other due
process clause (the one that operates as a constraint on the states)
"rights," the Supreme Court has never required compensation to be paid for a mere
regulation.
17. Although one of them comes close. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S.
at 322-23.
18. Obviously, property rights and the government's power to affect them are central, but not so much as the basis for resolving the question as for the motivation for
raising it in the first place. The motivation is, of course, to protect (and, perhaps,
amplify) private wealth embodied in private property rights.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

9
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is in the Fourteenth Amendment, and it says essentially the same
thing. 20 The due process limitations on exercises of governmental
power have, as we know, been conventionally divided into two
broad categories, "procedural due process" and so-called "substantive due process." The basic idea of procedural due process is
pretty intuitive: Before the government's agents or functionaries
can deprive a person of property (or liberty or life) certain procedures-"process"-must first be observed. Procedural due process
is, as the name implies, about "process."
Substantive due process is also about "process," though perhaps in not quite so obvious a way. Whereas the primary concern
of procedural due process is that the government's agents and
functionaries follow all the requirements of extant "law" before depriving people of property (or liberty, or life), the primary concern
of substantive due process is that the law itself be validly created.
The requirement of substantive due process is a corollary of the
concept of limited government-a government of limited powers.
As the Supreme Court has written: "There are, of necessity, limits
beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go. [T]he courts must
obey the Constitution rather than the law-making department of
government, and must, upon their own responsibility, determine
21
whether, in any particular case, these limits have been passed."
In other words, substantive due process is a kind of rule of ultra
vires. The Constitution expressly imposes a number of limitations
on the government's powers-for example, with respect to free expression, freedom of the press, regulation of assembly, and the establishment of religions. In addition to these express limitations
on the government's power, the Supreme Court has also recognized that there are other limitations, implicit and more general,
as well-such as the requirement that the governmental power be
exercised in the public interest. In this regard, what is of particular concern for the present discussion is a species of substantive
due process, sometimes known as "economic due process."
The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public
interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.
In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise

20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. .. ").
21. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
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or conclusive, but is subject to the
of its police powers is not final
22
supervision of the courts.

Under the umbrella of "economic due process," the Supreme Court
of an earlier time undertook to evaluate and selectively strike
down a number of legislative enactments (including land-use regulations) 23 on the ground that the legislation was outside the legislature's power to enact.
The primary "test" of economic process was stated succinctly
in the case of Lawton v. Steele. 24 At issue in Lawton was a statute
that prohibited certain kinds of fishing nets and authorized government agents to take and destroy the offending nets wherever
found. 25 The Court upheld the statute but in doing so spelled out
the following test to be used by the courts in reviewing legislative
acts:
" The interests of the public generally must require the
interference;
* The means must be reasonably necessary to accomplish the
public purpose;
* The means must be not unduly oppressive upon
26
individuals.
The doctrine of economic due process fell into disrepute during the
New Deal era, after the Supreme Court struck down a number of
measures that Congress had adopted to alleviate the Great Depression. By 1938, the Court itself had largely emasculated the
doctrine. It did so by adopting, in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,27 what has come to be known as the "rational basis" test:
"[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transaction is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless . . .it is of
such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon
some rational basis ....,,2s A statute "depriving" a person of property could be struck down on "economic due process" grounds only
22. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
23. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928);
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
24. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
25. 152 U.S. at 135.
26. Id. at 137.
27. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See also Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495,
508-09 (1937) (explaining that there could be no constitutional challenge to economic
legislation where the legislature acted rationally).
28. Id. at 152.

11
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if it could be found to have no rational basis-an almost insupera29
ble test to meet.
Meanwhile, at the same time that the jurisprudence of "economic due process" was evolving, there were also some interpretive developments concerning the takings clause itself, creating
the foundation for what has become the doctrine of "regulatory
takings." Remember, as I mentioned earlier, the original understanding of the takings clause was that it applied only to physical
takings of property. However, in an 1871 case, Pumpelly v. Green
Bay Co.,3° the Supreme Court made a substantial inroad on that
notion. The Pumpelly case was brought by a landowner against
his downstream neighbor who had built a dam that caused water
to back up, flooding the complainant's property.3 1 The defendant
had built his dam under a license granted by the state, and he
asserted that he therefore had a "right, under legislative authority, to build and continue the dam without legal responsibility for
those injuries." 3 2 The question thus became whether "the State
had a right to inflict [the damages sustained by the plaintiff] without making any compensation for them." 33 The takings clause
was asserted as the basis for concluding that the state did not
34
have such a right.
The linchpin of the defendant's argument was that "there is
no taking of the land within the meaning of the constitutional provision, and that the damage was a mere consequential result" of a
legitimate governmental action, fostering the improvement of a
29. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). A post-1938 case in which
the Court seems to have struck down legislation at least partially on "substantive due
process" grounds is Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977)
(questioning whether limited definition of "family" in zoning regulations rationally
furthers some legitimate state purpose). However, the opinions in Moore are deeply
divided, and the interest injured by the legislation was as much a "family" interest as
a property one.
30. 80 U.S. 166 (1871). Actually, the Pumpelly case was decided under the takings clause of the Wisconsin Constitution (now Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 13). However, to
simplify this brief history, that is a distinction which can be safely glided over since it
seems to have had no enduring substantive impact. See Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17
N.J.L. 129 (N.J. 1839). The main importance for the case itself was that, at the time,
it was not yet thought that the takings clause in the Fifth Amendment applied to the
states. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 176-77. The "incorporation" of the takings clause so it
applied against the states was to come later in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
31. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 177.
32. Id. at 176.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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navigable stream. 35 If indeed there was no "taking" within the
meaning of the Constitution, then the case would be governed by
the essentially due process consideration of whether the public interest (in navigation) sufficiently justified any deprivations that
the plaintiff sustained. The defendant argued, moreover, that this
was not a case of a "taking" in the constitutional sense because
"[t]he defendant's lands have not been taken or appropriated.
They are only affected. . ."36 In other words, the plaintiff still
had his land; it was just under some water.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant's contention concerning the inapplicability of the takings clause. It declared instead "where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by
having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of
the Constitution.... ."37 The destruction of private property is the
equivalent of "taking" it for purposes of the taking clause. 38 Because there was no provision for just compensation in the damlicensing statutes at issue in Pumpelly, they were void, 3 9 and
40
therefore provided no legal defense.
The next great landmark in the regulatory-takings series was
Mugler v. Kansas.4 1 Mugler was a commercial brewer in Kansas.
In 1881, Kansas decided it would be a good idea to outlaw beer.
The state proceeded to institute "prohibition" by adopting a constitutional amendment and implementing it by statute. 4 2 For
Mugler, this was a disaster. His brewery was "erected for the purpose of manufacturing beer, and cannot be put to any other
".

use.

. . ."43

45

His investment was left with "little value"44 or "no

value."

35. Id. at 177 (emphasis in the original).
36. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 174 (emphasis in the original).

37. Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
38. See id. at 179 (stating, "a serious interruption to the common and necessary
use of property may be ... equivalent to the taking of it .. ")
39. Id. at 182.
40. Id. at 181.
41. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
42. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 654-55.
43. Id. at 654.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 664. "[O]r, at least, will be materially diminished in value...." Id. The
Court did not seem to think it made a difference which of these resulting values was
in fact the case.
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Subsequently Mugler was indicted and convicted of manufacturing and selling intoxicating beverages. 4 6 In the United States
Supreme Court, he sought to have the Kansas legislation declared
void.4 7 As his constitutional bases, he asserted both the takings
clause and the due process clause. 48 The takings-clause argument
relied in part on Pumpelly v. Green Bay. Just as the owner in
Pumpelly suffered a "taking" when his land had been flooded with
water, so Mugler's brewery was flooded with regulation. Either
way, the government's action would be subject to the "fundamental maxim of all free governments," allegedly recognized in
Pumpelly, "that whenever the necessities of the public require
that the property of a citizen shall be taken or destroyed, compen49
sation must be made for the loss."
The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that Mugler's case fell
under the due process clause rather than under the takings
clause. 5 0 According to the Court, governmental impairments of
land-use "not directly encroaching upon private property . . . do
not constitute a taking within the meaning of the constitutional
provision, or entitle the owner of such property to compensa-

tion.

. . .

51

Pumpelly was distinguished as involving a "physical

invasion of the real estate [by the flooding], and a practical ouster
of his possession." 5 2 As for mere land-use regulations, the court
said: "A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes
that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the
health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just
sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the
53
public benefit."
Mugler's due process contentions also failed. The Supreme
Court rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment could
be read to restrain the states' exercise of the "police powers" to
protect public heath, safety, morals and welfare, 54 or to decide
what is necessary for that purpose.5 5 "[A]ll property in this coun46. Id. at 653.
47. Mulger, 123 U.S. at 653.
48. Id. at 664.
49. Mulger v. Kansas, 1887 U.S. LEXIs 2204 (Dec. 5, 1887) (statements of Mr.
George G. Vest, counsel for plaintiff in error).
50. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668.
51. Id. at 668.
52. Id. (quoting Trans. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878)).
53. Id. at 668-69.
54. Id. at 664, 669.
55. Nor can legislation (prohibiting uses declared "injurious to the health, morals,
or safety") come within the Fourteenth Amendment, in any case, unless it is apparent
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try is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it
shall not be injurious to the community. "56
But who decides, so as to bind us all, what is and is not "injurious to the community"? That was the pivotal question in the
case-not whether beer is too socially intolerable to allow, but who
decides whether it is. "[Fior this purpose," the Court quoted, "the
largest legislative discretion is allowed," adding "the discretion
57
cannot be parted with any more than the [police] power itself."
It is up to the legislature and not to the courts to decide what is,
and is not, too socially intolerable to allow.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Mugler did not make a decision about the content or extent of Mugler's property rights, or
whether the legislature had good cause to ban beer, but rather
about the structure of government. As times change, and as
knowledge, needs, and values evolve with the times, the "governmental power" must reside somewhere to protect and advance the
public interest "as the special exigencies of the moment may require ...."58 Under our constitutional structure the governmental
power to keep the laws up-to-date resides in the democratically
59
elected legislature, not in the courts.
With the annual volume of legislation, one hardly has to be
reminded how changing conditions can require changes in the law.
Examples of policy reversal abound. A hundred or so years ago, at
the time of Mugler, beer was too socially intolerable to allow (in
Kansas) and margarine was too socially intolerable to allow (in
Pennsylvania) 60 while, at roughly the same time, Coca Cola contained cocaine. 6 1 The "noxious" swamps and bogs of yesteryear
are the valued wetlands of today. Beaches and riverbanks, once
thought to be ideal places to build a house, are now viewed, in the
light of some expensive disasters, in a very different way. What is
"too socially intolerable to allow"? It depends. Not so long ago it
was beer and margarine but not opiates while today it is exactly
the opposite. If the laws are to be kept in harmony with the times,
somebody has to decide what changes the public interest rethat its real object is not to protect the community, or to promote the general well-

being, but, under the guise of police regulation, to deprive the owner of his liberty and
property, without due process of law. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
56. Id. at 665.
57. Id. at 669 (citations omitted).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 669.
60. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
61. See United States v. Housley, 751 F. Supp. 1446, 1447 (D. Nev. 1990).
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quires-and, hence, the crucial question of our constitutional
structure: "Who decides?" When litigants and courts invoke the
takings clause and "property rights" to overturn determinations
by the elected legislature, the point is to transfer that ultimate
decision-making power from the legislature to the courts.
It was precisely such a removal of power from the legislature
that occurred in the third landmark case in this series: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.6 2 As the reader probably knows very
well, Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon was the first case in which the
Supreme Court recognized that there could be such a thing as a
regulatory taking. The case is well-known, and I will not discuss
it at length, but I want to note two things: First (and this often
passes notice), Pennsylvania Coal was not actually decided under
the takings clause but under the due process clause-as essentially a case of economic due process. The rationale for the actual
decision in the case was that the Pennsylvania statute failed all
63
three elements of the Lawton v. Steele test, quoted above:
1) The interests of the public generally did not require the interference with the coal company's right to mine coal out
from under people's houses:
"This is the case of a single private house .... But usually
in ordinary private affairs the public interest does not warrant much of this kind of interference. A source of damage
to such a house is not a public nuisance .... The extent of
the public interest is shown by the statute to be
limited ....
2)

-64

The means were not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose:

"Furthermore, it is not justified as a protection of personal
65
safety. That could be provided for by notice."
3)

66
The means were unduly oppressive:

"[The statute] purports to abolish what is recognized in
Pennsylvania as an estate in land-a very valuable estate-

62. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For any who may possibly be unaware, the issue in
Pennsylvania Coal was the validity of a state statute that prohibited the mining of
.certain coal"-specifically that which lay beneath homes, streets, and various other
surface improvements. The statute's object was to prevent the disastrous subsidence
that could occur in the aftermath of undermining, which deprives surfaces structures
of vertical support.
63. See supra text accompanying note 26.
64. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413-14.
65. Id. at 414.
66. Id.
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and what is declared by the Court
below to be a contract
67
hitherto binding the plaintiffs."

Therefore, the Pennsylvania Coal opinion concludes: "[W]e
should think it clear that the statute does not disclose a public
interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights. ' 68 The analysis so far
is pure "economic due process" judicial "supervision"69 of the legislature, and it was enough to decide the case.
The second thing I want to mention about the Pennsylvania
Coal decision is that, contrary to its general reputation, it can not
be fairly regarded as a landmark for the protection of private
property rights. Rather, what the case did, merely, was accord
constitutional protection to one group of property owners at the
expense of another group of property owners-specifically, it protected the interests of the big coal companies at the expense of
ordinary homeowners. Therefore, as a charter for the protection
of private property rights, the Pennsylvania Coal case was decidedly wanting when it comes to the most important item of private
70
property that most Americans own.
At any rate, after deciding that the interests of American
homeowners were not of sufficient public concern to justify interference with great industrial interests, the Pennsylvania Coal decision went on to lay out, famously, what the Supreme Court has
later called an "advisory opinion" 7 1 on the takings clause. It was
in this portion of the opinion that Justice Holmes penned the famous lines: "To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional
purposes as appropriating or destroying it,"72 and "while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking."73
67. Id.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1895) ([The legislature's] determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is
subject to the supervision of the courts."). Accord Mugler, 123 U.S. at 664.
70. It is a bit ironic that the Pennsylvania Coal case is so frequently touted by
property-rights advocates as the supreme protector of private property when, in fact,
the case specifically held that there was not much public interest in protecting the
kind of private property that, for most people, is their single most important and valuable asset, their homes.
71. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 484 (1987).
72. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414.
73. Id. at 415.
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While the Pennsylvania Coal opinion did not say how far is
"too far," it did make clear that a mere regulation of use could
effectuate a taking-by going "too far." Hence, the birth of "regulatory takings."
Another forty years went by in which the Supreme Court did
not explain how far is "too far." By the early 1980s, however, two
different formulations for deciding "takings" cases were being repeated by the Supreme Court in regulatory cases. For convenience, I will refer to these as the "three-part test" and the "twopart test."74 They may be summarized as follows:
* Three-part test (Penn Central)-factors having "particular
significance":
* Economic impact;
* Extent of interference with reasonable investmentbacked expectations;
" "Character" of the interference. 75
* Two-part test (Agins v. City of Tiburon). A taking occurs if a
regulation:
* Does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest, or
* Deprives the owner of economically viable use of the
76
land.
The three-part test originated in the case of Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.7 7 The Court denied that
there was any "set formula" for deciding takings cases, 78 but it
described the three factors in the test as having "particular significance." 7 9 Apparently the three factors were to be looked at together, a kind of seat-of-the-pants weighing of non-comparables.
. 74. See my extensive treatment of these two formulations in my earlier article,
Economic Due Process and the Takings Clause, 4 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 411 (1987)
[hereinafter Economic Due Process].
75. By "character" the Court meant whether the government's interference with
private property constitutes a physical intrusion, or whether it was a mere adjustment of the burdens and benefits of living together in a civilized society, in other
words, a regulation. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978). But cf. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717 n.2, 718 (1987) (treating "character"
factor as looking to whether the government's action was "extraordinary" in going
beyond what was "appropriate" to achieve the government's valid objectives):
76. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
77. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
78. Id. at 124.
79. Id.
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Meanwhile, the Court was also framing its "takings" rationales in terms of a different test, the two-part test. The general
conceptual elements of the two-part test were also mentioned in
Penn Central,8 0 but the test's canonical formulation came a couple
of years later in Agins v. City of Tiburon, viz., land-use regulation
can effect a taking if it does not "substantially advance legitimate
state interests,.., or it denies an owner economically viable use of
his land .... ,l- If either part of the two-part test applies to a regulation on land use, the regulation will be a taking.
The Supreme Court employed the two-part test and the threepart test more or less simultaneously for a number of years but,
curiously, it rarely referred to both in the same case.8 2 Maybe it
was simply that some of the justices felt more comfortable with
the amorphous "no set formula" three-part analysis, while others
liked the more structured discretion of the two-part test.
The case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council8 3 represented a kind of apogee for the two-part test.8 4 In Lucas, an owner
of beachfront lots claimed a right to compensation for a taking after a state agency designated his lots as effectively non-buildable
5
under the South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act.8 Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, which held that the
owner was entitled to compensation.8 6 In doing so, the Court regarded the key distinction to be whether the complaining owner's
land had other valuable uses in addition to the ones deemed by
the legislature to be too anti-social to allow. As long as such other
valuable uses exist, the legislature has the power to prohibit
80. Id. at 127.
81. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
82. See Economic Due Process, supra note 74, at 417-45.
83. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
84. Although the opinion mentions the factors of the three-part test in a footnote,
and states they are "keenly relevant to takings analysis generally," Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1019 n.8, the majority opinion essentially ignores the constitutional force of the factors as such. In particular, as Justice Kennedy pointed out in his concurring opinion,
"The finding of 'no value' should have been considered under the Takings Clause by
reference to the owner's reasonable, investment-backed expectations ....
Where a
taking is alleged from regulations which deprive the property of all value, the test
must be whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expectations." 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The continued importance of the
three-part test, especially the "investment-backed expectations" factor was decisively
reinforced ten years later in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional
PlanningAgency, 535 U.S. 302, 321-32 & 336 (2002). See also Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 608 (2001).
85. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008-09.
86. Id. at 1026-32.
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harmful uses. As Justice Scalia wrote: It is "a reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly with respect to the full scope of the
State's police power" that "government may, consistent with the
Takings Clause, affect property values by regulation without incurring an obligation to compensate .... ,"87 If such other valuable
uses are absent, however, then the legislature may not prohibit
the anti-social uses (the only "valuable" uses) by ordinary regulation-it must "regulate by purchase."8 8 Under the second prong of
the two-part test, compensation is required if a government action
deprives land of "all economically beneficial uses .... "8 9
I will say a few things about the larger significance of the Lucas case in a moment, but first I want to focus attention on a curious thing about the two-part test of takings, namely, the fact that
this test looks like a resurrection, with a bit of linguistic tweaking,
of the old "economic due process" doctrine as formulated in Lawton v. Steele. To see this more clearly, observe first that the elements of the two-part test are actually three in number, and they
correspond almost exactly to the three elements of economic due
process that were a hundred years ago announced in Lawton v.
Steele.90 Here is a table of the counterparts:
"Legitimate state interest" - "needs of the public require the
interference"
"Substantially advances" -' "means reasonably necessary to accomplish the public purpose"
"Does not deny economically viable use" - "not unduly oppressive on individuals"
Actually it should be no surprise that the two-part test looks so
much like the old economic due process test. When the two-part
test first emerged (originally in Penn Central, and then in Agins),
the Supreme Court cited "economic due process" cases as precedents. 9 1 Thus, both analytically as well as historically it looks
87. Id. at 1023.
88. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
89. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (emphasis in original).

90. See supra text accompanying note 26.
91. The Penn Central opinion, 438 U.S. at 125, cited Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928), which was plainly decided on the basis of economic due
process analysis: "[Tihe invasion of the property. .. was serious and highly injurious
...and, since a necessary basis for the support of that invasion is wanting, the action
of the zoning authorities comes within the ban of the Fourteenth Amendment and
cannot be sustained." See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (also
citing Nectow). The Penn Central opinion, 438 U.S. at 126-27, also cited Goldblatt v.
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very much as though the two-part test for takings has become a
kind of placeholder for the old doctrines of economic due process
that the Supreme Court nominally abandoned over sixty years
ago. Through the application of the two-part test of "taking," the
basic ideology of economic due process breathes new life.
And what is the basic ideology of economic due process? Primarily, it is the idea that the validity of legislative acts is to be
tested by the courts against the three kinds of policy considerations set out in Lawton v. Steele-public need, suitability of
means, and impact on private interests. 9 2 It is the legal principle
that "judicial review"-judicial "supervision"93 of legislative decision making-extends to reconsidering the crucial policy choices
as to what is and is not too socially intolerable to allow, viz.,
whether the public interest requires government interference ("legitimate state interest"), whether the legislature's chosen means
to an end are reasonably necessary ("substantially advances"),
and whether the means are unduly oppressive ("denies economically viable use"). In other words, the basic ideology of economic
due process is that the constitutional structure of governmentspecifically, the division of power between the legislature and the
judiciary-gives courts the power to second-guess elected legislatures on the "wisdom" of economic legislation.
Thus, by way of the two-part test of takings, the Supreme
Court in Lucas has effectively reclaimed some of the ground that
it relinquished when, in the late 1930s, it announced that federal
courts would henceforth apply a "rational basis" test in deciding
due process challenges to the constitutionality of economic legislation.9 4 Although, after Lucas, the "rational basis" test may still
apply to cases where the land in question also has valuable nonprohibited uses, 95 Lucas made clear that it does not apply in those
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), which in turn was based on the economic
due process landmark, Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
92. See supra text accompanying note 26.
93. See Lawton, 152 U.S. at 137 ("[The legislature's] determination as to what is a
proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the
supervision of the courts."). Accord Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 664 (1837).
94. See supra text accompanying note 27.
95. An intriguing open question is whether the first prong of the two-part test of
takings is to be treated as a serious constraint on legislative actions, i.e., whether
there is to be strict scrutiny on the questions of whether challenged legislation indeed
responds to a "legitimate state interest" and whether it "substantially advance[s]"
that interest. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. At the very least, the Lucas opinion evidences deep skepticism about relying on legislative recitations of justifications in applying these tests-saying that since such justifications "can be formulated in
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situations where the legislature has identified and prohibited
harms that are inseparable from the only "economically beneficial" uses that the land happens to have. 96 In this latter kind of
case, according to Lucas, legislated prohibitions designed to prevent harms (such as destroying ecological values for the sake of
short-term gain) will be valid only if they "do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the
courts.... ."9 7-for example, under the law of nuisance. 98 Thus, it
is the courts, not elected legislatures, who are to have the last
word on whether proscribed conduct is really and truly too socially
intolerable to allow.
Moreover, the Lucas Court made clear that the lower courts
are not to use judicial review in takings cases as an occasion to
expand upon the "result[s] that could have been achieved in the
courts" in order to uphold legislative determinations-for example
by stretching the law of nuisance or otherwise devising novel
"common-law" notions about what is too socially intolerable to allow. On the contrary, the Court admonished that, in deciding
"what existing state law permits," a legislated land-use regulation
"may be defended only if an objectively reasonable application of
relevant precedents would exclude those beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the land is presently found." 99
It may be debated whether environmental protection laws
were the Supreme Court majority's primary target here, but they
were certainly among the most directly hit. It is precisely environmentally sensitive lands (such as ocean dunes and wetlands) that
are among those most likely not to have any other "economically
beneficial" uses if the right to strip them of their long-term natural values is taken away.
The Supreme Court predicted that its rule in Lucas would not
hamstring legislatures except in "extraordinary circumstance [s]"
or "relatively rare situations" because government regulation seldom has the effect of depriving a landowner of "all economically
beneficial uses." 10 0 That rosy prediction is, however, questionapractically every case, this amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid
staff." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025 n.12.
96. There is language in Lucas indicating that takings of all economically beneficial value would constitute a per se taking only when the property involved is land, as
opposed to personal property. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28.

97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 1029.
Id.
Id. at 1031 n.18.
Id. at 1017-18.
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ble. No doubt the Court is correct that, no matter what (realistic)
regulation is applied, it will rarely occur that affected land parcels
will end up with literally no value-in the sense that there is no
one in the market who would pay anything for it whatsoever.
There will always probably be at least some speculative value' 0 '
and, beyond that, also some residuum of marketable usefulness
for which, at the right price, some buyer might be found. 10 2 In the
final analysis, then, whether "all value" takings are rare or not
depends a great deal on how one is to understand the concept of
"all economically beneficial uses." Will it mean what it says-that
the land must be made literally devoid of market value (including
speculative value)-or will there be some sort of de minimis qualification under which the courts are to disregard low-value uses
such as buffers, bird-watching, viewsheds, or the like?
The factual context of Lucas supplies at least some basis for
believing that minimal residual values will not prevent a compensable taking from occurring. 10 3 In addition, the Court has said
later (in dictum), "a State may not evade the duty to compensate
04
on the premise that the landowner is left with a token interest."'1
At any rate, if the courts do disregard minimal residual values, we
101. There are invariably speculators willing to gamble that even the most
severe restrictions will eventually be lifted or modified so as to render the
property usable again. If the existence of such a residual market for the
property could defeat a claim for a regulatory taking, no regulatory taking could ever be proved and the concept would be rendered meaningless.
In fact, when courts have determined that property has been rendered
unfit for economically viable activity, they have found a Fifth Amendment
taking even though the property obviously continued to have market
value.
Fla. Rock Indus. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 167 (1985).
102. A major exception would be lands subject to environmental regulations that
require their owners to make extensive expenditures-for the clean up of deposited
toxics, for example. It is not at all far-fetched to think of a parcel of land whose maximum potential-use value is far less than the legally required clean-up costs. This
would constitute a pretty clear case of a government regulation that deprives an
owner of "all economically beneficial use." An old authority for allowing such an elimination of "all economically beneficial use" is Moeschen v. Tenement House Dep't, 203
U.S. 583 (1906), affg without opinion, 72 N.E. 231 (N.Y. 1904) (upholding requirement that outdoor privies be replaced with indoor toilets even when the cost of replacement exceeded the value of the premises, thus rendering them of negative
value).
103. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009 n.2. The opinion pointed out that the state's law "did
allow the construction of certain nonhabitable improvements, e.g., 'wooden walkways
no larger in width than six feet,' and 'small wooden decks no larger than one hundred
forty-four square feet[,]"' but these did not suffice to prevent the conclusion that the
owner was entitled to compensation under the Constitution. Id.
104. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (emphasis added).

23

26

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

may find that ecologically vulnerable lands may present recurring
occasions for courts to overturn legislative determinations to preserve by regulation. Elected legislatures might determine that
harms such as filling in (otherwise) low-market-value wetlands or
destroying endangered-species habitat are too socially intolerable
to allow but, unlike the beer in Mulger, the margarine in Powell,
or narcotic drugs today, state legislatures cannot prevent such
harms by police power regulation. Only a court would have the
power to treat these new kinds of mischief as "illegal"-by acting
to extend the common law (e.g., of nuisance)-and the Lucas opin10 5
ion, as already mentioned, would take a dim view of even that.
More broadly, given the reality that many environmental assets
may have little or no value as market (economic) assets-often
precisely because of their "public" value-the Lucas case may indeed amount to a rather appreciable restructuring of governmental authority, a significant transfer of environmental policymaking power from the elected legislatures to the courts. A substantial new inroad has been created to reduce the power of legislatures to protect the natural environment on which we all
depend.

105. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 n.18.
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